UCC Changes Became the Legal Construct of the Banking Elite’s Reset Takeover Plan (Page 3)

Changes in the Uniform Commercial Code (1994) that Support Taking Everything

The shift towards a comprehensive financial reset gained significant traction in 1994 with pivotal alterations to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).

Underpinning this transformation was a deliberate effort to redefine the legal status of securities, unraveling a historical foundation that had remained unchanged for centuries. Unlike overt legislative overhauls, these alterations occurred quietly, with changes discreetly implemented across all 50 states in the United States.

Before 1994, securities had enjoyed a longstanding status as personal property, entailing clear ownership and well-established legal protocols.

However, the subtle yet profound changes introduced in the UCC severed this historical connection.

The introduction of a new legal construct, the “security entitlement,” marked a departure from centuries-old principles, fundamentally altering the nature of ownership. No longer did investors and institutions hold tangible assets; instead, they found themselves tethered to contractual claims—a weakened form of ownership that proved pivotal in times of insolvency (bankruptcy).

The deliberate and synchronized implementation of these changes across all 50 states underscored a meticulous strategy. Operating below the threshold of widespread awareness, this legal maneuver set the stage for subsequent financial system takeover plans.

These alterations within the UCC, demonstrate how seemingly subtle modifications have paved the way for the total transfer of securities (property) from unsecured owners to secured creditors on an unprecedented scale.

Bankruptcy Law Amendments (2005) and Safe Harbor

The year 2005 marked another critical juncture in the orchestration of the Great Financial Reset, as amendments to bankruptcy laws introduced a transformative concept known as Safe Harbor. While the term suggests security and protection, its implications diverged significantly from its benign facade.

Instead, Safe Harbor became a mechanism ensuring secured creditors’ unequivocal access to client assets, even in cases involving fraud.

Pre-2005, fraudulent transfers or conveyances were subject to scrutiny and could be clawed back by the bankruptcy trustee. This safeguard prevented undue advantages for secured creditors in times of insolvency.

However, the introduction of Safe Harbor tipped the scales decisively in favor of secured creditors, granting them an unprecedented level of control over client assets.

The testing and confirmation of these changes occurred during the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse.

In the Lehman Brothers case, JPMorgan, acting as both custodian for client assets and a secured creditor, navigated a legal landscape that would have previously been deemed constructively fraudulent. The bankruptcy court’s judgment in favor of JPMorgan in the southern district of New York underscored a new legal order—one where the entitlement to seize client assets became exclusive to a select group of financial behemoths.

The pivotal question of whether JPMorgan belonged to the “protected class” of entitled persons was answered affirmatively by the court, explicitly acknowledging its stature as one of the world’s largest financial institutions.

This legal precedent set a chilling tone, reserving the privilege of seizing client assets solely for a select group of major banks —a watershed moment that fortified the position of secured creditors in the impending financial reset.

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